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Disloyal Employees: How Far Should the
Statute Go to Protect Employers from
Trade Secret Theft?
Audra A. Dial and John M. Moye,
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP*
This Article discusses the current split between the federal circuits over the scope of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and whether it extends to employees who
steal an employer’s electronic trade secrets to which they were lawfully given access as
employees. After discussing the legislative history of the CFAA and various appellate
decisions interpreting its scope, the Authors argue that recent court decisions interpreting
the statute—exemplified by the Fourth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC
v. Miller and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Nosal—are unduly narrow in their
scope.
The Authors argue that the CFAA, by its language, is broad enough to provide for civil
liability when a disloyal employee misappropriates electronic trade secrets in violation of
an employer’s computer use policies. A contrary approach is harmful to employers and
inconsistent with the statute’s intent. In light of these ambiguities, clarification of the
CFAA’s scope—either from the Supreme Court or via legislative action—is sorely
needed.

* Ms. Dial is a partner in Kilpatrick Townsend’s Technology Litigation Team, where she
focuses her practice on litigating trade secret disputes and patent infringement matters. Mr. Moye is an
associate on the firm’s Technology Litigation Team. He is also an adjunct professor at the University
of North Carolina School of Law, where he teaches a course focused on trade secrets law. The
Authors would like to thank Jeffrey H. Fisher of Kilpatrick Townsend for his invaluable assistance in
preparing this Article.
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Introduction
One of the many changes wrought by the digital revolution is that
employers—be they large companies, hospitals, or government agencies—
are storing more and more of their proprietary, sensitive information on
electronic servers. Visit any employer’s office today—large or small, in any
industry, in any part of the United States—and the chances are high that
their business documents, including customer lists, formulas, pricing data,
personnel records, and financial records are maintained on electronic
servers rather than in physical file cabinets. The employees who work at
these offices no longer simply use email to communicate with each other;
they also regularly access their employer’s databases to review electronic
documents and data, and they use this information in their regular course
of business.
Growing access to electronic information has raised a related
question: How can employers protect their most sensitive, electronically
stored trade secrets (such as formulas, software code, or financial data)?
Many employers require their employees to follow “computer use”
policies that provide, for example, that the employee will not use the
electronic information to which she has access for any improper or
unauthorized purpose. But what happens if the employee violates those
computer use policies and, while still employed, steals the employer’s most
sensitive electronic records?
For example, imagine that—in the course of her work day—an
employee logs onto a password-protected company server, visits an
electronic directory to which she has proper access (because of her
position in the company), and steals thousands of the company’s most
sensitive files by transferring them to an external hard drive. Days later,
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that employee terminates her employment, hands off the external hard
drive to a competitor, and joins the competitor’s operations to compete
directly against the former employer using information obtained during
her employment there. What remedies, if any, does the former employer
have?
In addition to an action for trade secret misappropriation (assuming
the information stolen involved a trade secret), the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (“CFAA”) has represented an additional method of
1
enforcement in recent years. That statute, originally passed in 1984,
imposes both criminal and civil liability on a person who “intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization” or “exceeds authorized
access,” thereby obtaining “information” from a computer that is “used in
2
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” Until recently, the CFAA
served as a powerful weapon in an employer’s arsenal when the employer
was faced with a deceptive employee who misappropriated electronic
information in violation of the employer’s computer use policies. In the
last decade, companies have increasingly raised CFAA claims alongside
state law claims for trade secret misappropriation in order to obtain
3
federal court jurisdiction.
More recently, however, it has become unclear whether and to what
extent the CFAA remains a viable method of enforcing the theft of
electronic information by internal employees. In WEC Carolina Energy
4
Solutions, LLC v. Miller, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened
the existing split between the federal circuits over whether the CFAA
extends to rogue employees who misuse electronic information when the
information was gained from a company computer to which the employee
had proper access.
In WEC, the Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth and Second Circuits to
hold that the CFAA cannot impose liability on an employee who was
given lawful access to company information but later misused that
5
information in violation of the employer’s computer use policies.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that the CFAA can only impose
liability on employees who are either not permitted to access certain
company information but do so anyway, or who otherwise exceed the
boundaries of their authorized access—perhaps by altering information

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
2. Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
3. See, e.g., Mobile Mark, Inc. v. Pakosz, No. 11-C-2983, 2011 WL 3898032 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6,
2011) (bringing a claim for trade secret theft alongside a CFAA claim); AssociationVoice, Inc. v.
AtHome Net, Inc., No. 10-CV-00109, 2011 WL 63508 (D. Col. Jan. 6, 2011) (same); Pac. Aerospace &
Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (same).
4. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
5. Id. at 207.
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in a computer beyond their access level. However, the court made clear
that the CFAA does not extend to an employee who has permission to
access certain electronic information and later misuses that information
7
in violation of a company use policy. This narrow interpretation of the
statute contrasts with the Seventh, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, which
8
have construed the CFAA as imposing liability in such circumstances.
This circuit split—and the confusion over the scope of the phrases
“exceeds authorized access” and “without authorization” in the statute—
carries significant implications for all employers. First, the ability to pursue
remedies under the CFAA against a misappropriating employee now
depends in part on the jurisdiction in which the action is being pursued.
Additionally, employers in those circuits that have taken a narrow
approach will also be limited in their ability to pursue disloyal employees
and will be required to take alternate measures to prevent the theft of their
sensitive electronic information. Employers in these jurisdictions may be
unable to obtain federal jurisdiction over trade secret misappropriation
claims (absent diversity) when an employee steals electronic information
from a company computer to which the employee had access. Whereas
previously companies victimized by disloyal employees would typically use
a federal CFAA cause of action alongside state causes of action like trade
9
secret theft in order to obtain federal court jurisdiction, that strategy may
no longer be viable in certain circuits.
This Article argues that the approach to the CFAA—exemplified by
the Fourth Circuit in WEC—is unduly narrow in its scope, and that the
type of conduct involved in WEC—a thieving employee who violated his
employer’s computer use policies and stole information to which he
initially had “access”—is precisely the type of conduct that the CFAA
was intended to prevent. At the very minimum, courts should recognize
that the CFAA is broad enough to provide for civil liability when a
disloyal employee misappropriates electronic information in contravention
of the employer’s computer use policies. An alternate, narrow view can be
damaging to employers, as it could foreclose opportunities to obtain a
remedy for disloyal conduct involving electronic information, particularly
if such information does not rise to the level of a trade secret.
Part I of this Article explains the history of the CFAA and its
purpose. Part II provides an overview of the existing circuit split,
including the recent WEC decision. Part III argues that the approach
taken by the Fourth, Ninth, and Second Circuits is unduly narrow in

6. Id. at 206.
7. Id. at 207.
8. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John,
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs. L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
9. See, e.g., WEC, 687 F.3d 199.
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scope, is contrary to the intent of the CFAA, and can be harmful to
employers. Part IV argues that clarification from the Supreme Court on
the scope of the CFAA is sorely needed in light of the existing circuit
split; the Court should recognize that the statute provides a civil remedy
in the case of a disloyal employee who misappropriates electronic trade
secret information in violation of an employer’s computer use policies.

I. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
10
Congress passed the CFAA in 1984. The statute was the first piece
11
of federal legislation to address computer crime. Originally, the CFAA
was intended to be an anti-hacking statute; it narrowly imposed criminal
liability on persons who accessed a computer “without authorization” or
“for purposes to which [the] authorization does not extend” in order to
commit three specific types of acts: (i) obtain national security secrets;
(ii) obtain personal finance records; or (iii) hack into federal government
12
computers.
Subsequent amendments, however, changed and significantly
13
expanded the reach of the CFAA. In 1994, Congress amended the CFAA
to permit civil actions by persons who suffered “damage or loss by reason
14
of a violation” of the statute. In 1996, Congress again amended the
statute so that it was no longer limited solely to particular types of digital
15
information. Congress also expanded the definition of “protected
computer,” which had originally been limited solely to “Federal interest”
16
computers. Today, the CFAA definition of “protected computer”
broadly encompasses any computer “which is used in or affecting
17
interstate or foreign commerce or communication.”
Advocates of both the broad and the narrow view of the phrase
“exceeds authorized access” in the CFAA have cited the legislative history
18
to support their argument. Those in favor of the narrow view point out
19
that Congress originally focused the Act to prevent computer hacking. In
10. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689. “There is [n]o specific
federal legislation in the area of computer crime.” Id. at 3691.
11. Id.
12. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
13. For a thorough discussion of each amendment to the CFAA, see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness
Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1563 (2010).
14. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXIX, 108 Stat. 2097,
2098 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
15. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491.
16. Id. at 3492.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2012).
18. Thomas E. Booms, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 543, 560–61 (2011).
19. See Briggs v. State, 704 A.2d 904, 911 (Md. 1998); Booms, supra note 18, at 560–61 (citing
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addition, courts adopting a narrow view of the statute have relied on the
1986 Amendment to the CFAA, which eliminated references to the
hacker’s “purposes” in obtaining the information and replaced them with
the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” suggesting that Congress
20
continued to focus on computer hackers. A 1996 Senate Report has also
been interpreted to suggest that the CFAA is meant to prevent outside
21
access to, not the misuse of, information. Thus, advocates of the narrow
view argue that, despite the broad language of the CFAA, it was drafted
to prevent computer hacking, and that the legislative history does not
suggest that Congress intended for the Act to apply more broadly to
misappropriation by “inside” employees.
In contrast, defenders of the broad view assert that the legislative
history of the CFAA just as strongly supports their position: The statute
extends to disloyal employees who steal their employers’ electronic
information. These advocates point out that that the CFAA, although
initially targeted at hackers, has been amended repeatedly and that each
22
subsequent amendment has expanded the scope of the CFAA. Indeed,
Congress has expanded the CFAA to include a private civil cause of
action where one did not initially exist, to apply to conduct well beyond
the original, enumerated factors, and to expand the types of computers
23
entitled to protection. Proponents of this broad view assert that
Congress intended the statute to cover a broad array of computer crimes.
Moreover, as the type and scope of computer crimes have changed over
the years as technology evolved and become more integral to businesses,

H.R. Rep. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706 (“[The CFAA] deals with an
‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere use of a computer.”)).
20. US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (D. Kan. 2009); see Shamrock Foods
Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (D. Ariz. 2008).
21. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (“Senate report[s have] suggested a difference between access
without authorization and exceeding authorized access based on the difference between ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders.’ Insiders were those with rights to access computers in some circumstances (such as
employees), whereas outsiders had no rights to access computers at all (such as hackers).” (citing S.
Rep. No. 104-357, 1996 WL 492169, at *4 (1996) and Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting
“Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596, 1630 (2003)).
22. See Booms, supra note 18, at 560 (citing Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Although the majority of CFAA cases still involve ‘classic hacking
activities,’ the CFAA’s reach has been expanded in the past two decades by the enactment of a private
cause of action and a more liberal judicial interpretation of the statutory provisions.”)).
23. Id.; see P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, L.L.C., 428 F.3d
504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he scope of [the CFAA’s] reach has been expanded over the last two
decades.”); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 104-357, at *7–8) (“The proposed § 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the interstate or
foreign theft of information by computer . . . . This [section] would ensure that the theft of intangible
information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical
items are protected . . . . The crux of the offense under § 1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse of a
computer to obtain the information.”).
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Congress has broadened the CFAA to cover far more than traditional
24
computer hacking by an “outsider.”
Federal courts have attempted to construe the purpose of the CFAA
and the meaning of key elements in the act, namely “exceeds authorized
access” and “without authorization,” against this complex legislative
history. In doing so, however, the courts have been unable to reach a clear
consensus. Although the circuit split has been unfolding for years, the
recent WEC decision has only exacerbated the disagreement among the
circuits as to whether the CFAA extends to a disloyal employee who
25
misappropriates the electronic trade secrets of her employer.

II. The Present Circuit Split
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in WEC
WEC involved a fact pattern that is all too familiar in trade secret
misappropriation cases. WEC, a company providing welding services to
the power industry, sued its ex-employee Willie Miller, his assistant Emily
Kelley, and their new employer Arc Energy Services, after Miller
downloaded a large number of electronic files, abruptly resigned from his
26
employment, and, along with Kelley, joined a competitor.
During Miller’s employment, he was provided a company laptop and
had been granted access to the company’s servers and intranet, which
contained “numerous confidential and trade secret documents,” including
pricing terms, information on pending projects, and other technical
27
information. WEC had written policies in place prohibiting employees
from (i) using any company information without authorization or
28
(ii) downloading it to a personal computer. However, WEC’s computer
use policies “did not restrict Miller’s authorization to access the
29
information.”
30
Miller resigned from WEC and joined Arc, a direct competitor.
While still employed by WEC, Miller downloaded a number of
confidential documents from the company’s servers and emailed them to
31
his personal email account. He and his assistant also “downloaded

24. Booms, supra note 18, at 560–61.
25. Compare WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206–07 (4th Cir.
2012), and United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012), with Int’l Airport Ctrs. L.L.C.
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
26. WEC, 687 F.3d at 202.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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confidential information to a personal computer.” Each of these actions
was taken solely to benefit Arc, Miller’s future employer, rather than
33
WEC. Twenty days after leaving WEC, Miller “used the downloaded
information to make a presentation on behalf of Arc to a potential WEC
customer,” who ultimately awarded projects to Arc based upon the
34
presentation.
WEC sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, asserting nine state causes of action—including misappropriation
of trade secrets, tortious interference with contract, and conversion—and a
35
federal cause of action under the CFAA. The district court dismissed the
CFAA claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), finding that WEC’s computer
policies only limited the “use of information not access to that
36
information.” The district court held that even if Miller and Kelley had
acted “contrary to [WEC] company policies regulating use, [such conduct]
would not establish a violation of company policies relevant to access, and,
37
consequently, would not support liability under the CFAA.” In other
words, the district court concluded that no liability was warranted under
the CFAA because Miller had been permitted to access the information
38
at issue as an employee. The remaining state law claims were then
39
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit
40
affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the CFAA. In its opinion,
the court examined the scope of the CFAA and whether its provisions
“extend to violations of policies regarding the use of a computer or
41
information on a computer to which a defendant otherwise has access.”
The court ultimately concluded that the phrases “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access” as used in the statute mean that an
employee cannot either “gain admission to a computer without approval”
or gain information that is located “outside the bounds of his approved
42
access.” The court declined to extend the CFAA to impose liability on
43
employees for “the improper use of information validly accessed.”

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, No. 0:10-CV-2775-CMC, 2011 WL
379458, at *5 (D. S.C. Feb. 3, 2011).
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. at *6.
40. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2012).
41. Id. at 203.
42. Id. at 204.
43. Id.
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Because WEC gave Miller access to the information that he allegedly
misappropriated, the Fourth Circuit concluded there was no basis for a
CFAA violation (regardless of the purpose behind his access of the
44
information).
The Fourth Circuit raised concerns about reading the CFAA too
45
broadly in light of the “rule of lenity” applicable in criminal law. The
court suggested that reading the CFAA more expansively could result in
potential liability for any employee who “checked the latest Facebook
posting or sporting event scores in contravention of his employer’s use
46
policy.” Construing the statute as one “meant to target hackers,” the
court held that a broader view could transform the CFAA “into a vehicle
for imputing liability to workers who access computers or information in
47
bad faith, or who disregard a use policy.”
B. Other Circuits Following WEC’s Narrow Approach to CFAA
Liability
The WEC panel’s decision was similar to that reached by the Ninth
48
Circuit in the criminal case of United States v. Nosal. Nosal involved a
former employee of an executive search firm, Korn/Ferry International,
who persuaded current employees of the firm to download confidential
information from Korn/Ferry’s computers and transfer the information
49
to Nosal in order to help him start a competing business. Although the
employees had legitimate “access” to the employer’s database and the
confidential information contained therein, the company’s internal
computer use policies prohibited the unauthorized disclosure of such
50
information. The federal government filed criminal charges against Nosal
under the CFAA, accusing him of “aiding and abetting the Korn/Ferry
employees in ‘exceed[ing their] authorized access’ with intent to
51
defraud.”
As in WEC, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc Nosal decision addressed
whether the phrase “exceeds authorized access” refers only to an employee
who accesses files that the employee does not have permission to access, or
whether it also penalizes an employee who has access to a computer by

44. Id. at 207.
45. Id. The Ninth Circuit raised similar concerns in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63
(9th Cir. 2012). Under the rule of lenity, “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity.” See U.S. v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991).
46. WEC, 687 F.3d. at 206.
47. Id. at 207.
48. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
49. Id. at 856.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)).
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virtue of her employment but uses such data for unauthorized purposes.
The government argued that the language of the CFAA was broad in its
scope and that the statute encompassed the improper use of electronic
53
information.
Specifically, the government noted that the phrase “exceeds
authorized access” was defined to include accessing “a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
54
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” The
government argued that the word “so” was defined in the CFAA as “in
that manner,” and that it referred to the manner in which the person
55
accessing the information uses the information she obtains or alters.
According to the government, the word “so” (as defined) specifically
referred to use, and a narrow reading of the statute would render the
56
word “so” superfluous. In addition, the government argued that this
narrow reading ignored that the CFAA distinguished between two
57
phrases: “without authorization” and “exceed authorized access.”
On appeal, the court recognized that the CFAA was “susceptible to
the Government’s broad interpretation” but ultimately found that the
text, the rule of lenity, and the purpose of the statute supported the more
58
restrictive interpretation. The court therefore held that “the plain
language of the CFAA ‘target[s] the unauthorized procurement or
59
alteration of information, not its misuse or misappropriation.’”
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit focused on the fact that the statute
was drafted to target hackers, and it read the phrase “exceeds authorized
access” as applying to inside hackers (that is, those who may have some
access to a company computer, but who go further and access—or “hack
60
into”—files to which they have no authorized access). The court also
recognized that the “rule of lenity” is applicable to criminal statutes,
explaining that if Congress meant for the CFAA to apply more broadly to
protect electronic trade secrets, it would have used clearer language to
61
signal its intent. The court expressed concern with expanding criminal
liability to conduct that, unlike hacking into a computer, is not “inherently

52. Id. at 857.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 856.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008)). Accord
Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005).
60. Nosal, 676 F.3d. at 857.
61. Id.
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62

wrongful.” Like the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a
broad interpretation of the CFAA would mean that routine violations of
employer computer use policies, such as “g-chatting with friends, playing
games, shopping or watching sports highlights,” could be transformed into
63
potential criminal violations. The court therefore concluded that
“exceeds authorized access” in the CFAA was “limited to violations of
64
restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.”
Because Nosal’s accomplices had been afforded access to the company’s
information, the court found that the government failed to satisfy the
65
element of “without authorization, or exceeds unauthorized access.”
Since Nosal in April 2012, a number of district courts in the Ninth
66
Circuit have followed this interpretation of the CFAA. In addition,
although no other circuit courts have expressly adopted the narrow
approach to the CFAA taken by the Ninth Circuit in Nosal and the Fourth
Circuit in WEC, a number of district courts in other circuits have adhered
to the narrow view of the statute with the expectation that their respective
circuits will follow. For example, district courts in the Second Circuit have
construed the phrases “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized
67
access” similarly to Nosal. Courts in the Sixth Circuit similarly appear

62. Id. at 860.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 864. The Nosal case was remanded to the Northern District of California following the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling. On remand, the government moved forward with certain criminal charges
against Nosal based on separate acts of “outsider hacking” that Nosal had allegedly committed
unrelated to the CFAA charges based on the information to which Nosal had lawfully had access as an
employee. See United States v. Nosal, CR-08-0237 EMC, 2013 WL 978226 at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The
United States argued that Nosal could be prosecuted under the CFAA for the “outsider counts”—in
which former Korn/Ferry employees had hacked a current employee’s password to access
Korn/Ferry’s “Searcher” database and had provided Nosal with confidential information. Id. The trial
court allowed those charges against Nosal to proceed. Id. at *9. On April 24, 2013—following two days
of jury deliberations—Nosal was convicted of the “outsider counts” under the CFAA. See Karen
Gullo, Ex-Korn/Ferry Executive Convicted of Trade-Secret Theft, BloombergBusinessweek (Apr. 24,
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-04-24/ex-korn-ferry-executive-convicted-of-trade-secrettheft-1. Nosal’s conviction shows that the CFAA remains a helpful tool for employers faced with
unauthorized acts of employee hacking, even if it is no longer viable in certain circuits as a means of
preventing “inside” theft by employees with lawful access to information.
66. See Incorp Servs. Inc. v. Incsmart.Biz Inc., 11-CV-4660-EJD-PSG, 2012 WL 3685994, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (citing Nosal and stating that “the CFAA is an anti-hacking statute, and not
a misappropriation statute”); Hat World, Inc. v. Kelly, CIV. S-12-01591 LKK, 2012 WL 3283486, at *5
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (same); see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Serv. Key, L.L.C., C 12-00790 SBA, 2012
WL 6019580, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (finding that using legitimate employee access for
improper purposes is “beyond the scope of the CFAA” under Nosal).
67. See Major, Lindsey & Africa, L.L.C. v. Mahn, 10 CIV 4329 CM, 2010 WL 3959609 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 2010) (finding that the Second Circuit is likely to adopt the narrow view); Univ. Sports Pub.
Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jet One Grp. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc.,
No. 08-CV-3980, 2009 WL 2524864, at *5–7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (adopting the narrow view and
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poised to follow the approach taken by the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits.
69
70
District courts in the Eighth Circuit and the Third Circuit have likewise
endorsed the Nosal interpretation of the CFAA and the narrow reading of
the phrases “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”
Consequently, these circuits will only impose liability under the
CFAA when a disloyal employee accesses files that she has never been
authorized to access. The mere misuse of electronically stored information
(by passing information to a competitor, for example) will not satisfy the
statutory threshold for civil liability under the CFAA if the employer gave
the employee access to such information as part of her employment.
C. The Contrary View: CITRIN and Its Progeny
In contrast, courts in other circuits have taken a broader approach
to liability under CFAA, holding that where an employee exceeds the
scope of his or her “authorized access” and downloads and misuses
sensitive company files in contravention of the employer’s use policies,
such conduct will constitute “unauthorized access” under the statute.
The Seventh Circuit first adopted this approach in International
71
Airport Centers v. Citrin. That case involved a defendant, Citrin, who
quit his job at International Airport Centers and started a competing
72
business in violation of his employment contract. Prior to returning his
company laptop, he deleted all of the electronic data on the laptop—
including data that he collected and data that would show that he engaged

stating that the “Second Circuit has implicitly adopted the narrow view”).
68. See Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2011)
(suggesting that Ninth Circuit interpretation of CFAA was proper); Ajuba Int’l L.L.C. v. Saharia, No.
11-12936, 2012 WL 1672713, at *11–12 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2012); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med.,
L.L.C., 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp.
2d 929, 933–36 (W.D. Tenn. 2008); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rickman, 554 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771
(N.D. Ohio 2008).
69. See Walsh Bishop Assocs., Inc. v. O’Brien, Civil No. 11-2673 DSD/AJB, 2012 WL 669069, at *3
(D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2012) (“[S]ection (a)(2) is not based on use of information; it concerns access.”);
Xcedex, Inc. v. VMware, Inc., No. 10-3589, 2011 WL 2600688, at *4 (D. Minn. June 8, 2011) (adopting a
narrow interpretation); Condux Int’l, Inc. v. Haugum, Civil No. 08-4824 (ADM/JSM), 2008 WL 5244818
(D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2008). But see NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(“The Court concludes that the broad view can best distinguish between the CFAA’s statutory language
‘exceeds authorized access’ and ‘unauthorized access’ by looking solely at the text of the statute.”).
70. See Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 378, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“The Court is
persuaded by the reasoning in the latter line of cases, and adopts the less capacious view of the legal
meaning of ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeds authorized access’ expressed therein.”); Brett Senior
& Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, CIV.A. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) (“The
conduct targeted by section (a)(4), however, is the unauthorized procurement or alteration of
information, not its misuse or misappropriation.”).
71. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
72. Id. at 419.
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in improper conduct before he quit his job. Citrin’s former employer
brought a civil action against Citrin under the CFAA, accusing Citrin of
accessing “a protected computer without authorization,” thereby causing
74
damage to the company.
On appeal of the district court’s dismissal of the CFAA claims under
Federal Rule 12(b)(6), Judge Posner wrote for the court that although
Citrin had initially been given access to company information, he had
breached his duty of loyalty when he quit and started a competing
75
business. The court then held that when Citrin terminated his agency
relationship with International Airport Centers, his “authority” to access
76
the company laptop was also terminated. Consequently, at the time Citrin
deleted the files on his laptop, he no longer had “authorization” to access
the laptop. Thus, the court held that Citrin acted “without authorization”
77
in violation of the CFAA.
On different facts, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a similarly expansive
interpretation of the phrase “exceeds authorized access.” In United States
v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the imposition of criminal
liability on a defendant who “obtained personal information [during his
78
employment] for a nonbusiness reason.” The defendant, Rodriguez,
worked as a representative for the Social Security Administration and had
been given access to databases containing sensitive, confidential personal
information—including any person’s social security number, date of birth,
79
address, and annual income. The Administration’s computer use policies
expressly prohibited employees from obtaining personal information
80
from the database without a legitimate business reason. In violation of
this policy, Rodriguez used the agency’s database to obtain the personal
records of seventeen individuals for decidedly nonbusiness reasons—
specifically, to obtain personal information about women for whom he
81
had romantic interests. A jury found Rodriguez guilty of seventeen
82
violations of the CFAA.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 420 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)).
75. Id. at 420–21.
76. Id. at 421 (quoting State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)) (“Violating the
duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse interests, voids the agency relationship. . . . Unless
otherwise agreed, the authority of the agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he
acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”).
77. Id. at 420 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)).
78. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
79. Id. at 1260.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1260–62.
82. Id. at 1262 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B)).
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On appeal, Rodriguez argued that his actions did not violate the
CFAA because he “accessed only databases that he was authorized to
83
use as a TeleService representative.” The Eleventh Circuit rejected his
argument, holding that because the Social Security Administration’s
computer use policy authorized Rodriguez to obtain personal information
only for actual business reasons, Rodriguez had “exceed[ed] authorized
access” when he obtained personal information for nonbusiness reasons,
thereby converting his otherwise permissible access into “unauthorized
84
access.”
To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly distinguished
85
an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, in
which the Ninth Circuit held that a former employee did not violate the
CFAA when he emailed documents that he was authorized to access to his
86
personal email account. The Rodriguez court explained that in Brekka,
there was no company policy prohibiting employees from sending email to
personal accounts, whereas the Social Security Administration’s policy
clearly prohibited Rodriguez from obtaining personal information for
87
nonbusiness reasons. Thus, the terms of the employer’s use policy were
pivotal to the Eleventh Circuit’s finding of criminal liability.
The Fifth Circuit has likewise taken a broad approach to liability
under CFAA, holding in United States v. John that even “authorized
access” to information may not be unlimited, particularly when the
defendant uses his authorized access “in furtherance of or to perpetrate a
88
crime.” In John, the defendant was a Citigroup employee with access to
89
Citigroup’s computer system and customer account information. The
defendant provided confidential customer information to her half-brother,
who then fraudulently charged four different Citigroup customers’
90
accounts. A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of “exceeding
authorized access” to a protected computer under § 1030(a)(2)(A) and (C)
91
of the CFAA.
On appeal, the defendant argued that she had access to Citigroup’s
computers and account information and that the CFAA prohibited only
unauthorized access to protected computers, not unauthorized use of
92
information. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that, although the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1263.
Id. (emphasis added).
581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 271.
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defendant technically had access to the confidential information, Citigroup’s
93
computer use policies expressly limited her access to certain uses. Using
confidential information to assist in perpetrating a fraud was not included
among the permitted uses, and thus the defendant’s participation in a
fraudulent criminal scheme exceeded her permissible “access” to
94
Citigroup’s electronically stored information.
The John court observed that the existence of Citigroup employee
policies—and John’s knowledge of such policies—established the
95
parameters of her “authorized access.” Although the court recognized
that violation of a confidentiality agreement should not always raise
criminal charges, the court found that an employee’s “access may be
96
exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”
Given that the company’s use policies prohibited the misuse of
confidential information and that the defendant was aware of those
policies, the court held that the defendant’s actions—which involved the
misuse of confidential information—violated the CFAA and satisfied the
97
“exceed authorized access” element of § 1030(a)(2).
District courts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have
followed this broader approach to CFAA liability, recognizing that when
an employee violates the terms of a computer use policy and engages in an
impermissible use of electronic information, that employee will be deemed
to have engaged in an “unauthorized” access of company information in
violation of the CFAA. In the Fifth Circuit, for example, district courts
98
have broadly interpreted the CFAA in both civil and criminal contexts.
Similarly, numerous district courts in the Seventh Circuit have found that
an employee’s breach of the duty of loyalty severs her authority to access
the employer’s information and exposes the employee to liability under
99
the CFAA. However, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have not
93. Id. at 271–72.
94. Id. at 271 (citing United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2007)) (holding that a
student who accessed part of a system to which he had not been given a password exceeded authorized
use).
95. Id. at 272.
96. Id. (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001)).
97. Id.
98. See Barnstormers, Inc. v. Wing Walkers, L.L.C., No. EP-10-CV-261-KC, 2011 WL 1671641
(W.D. Tex. May 3, 2011) (citing John, 597 F.3d at 269) (holding that a defendant who was authorized
to access a website as a member of the public violated the CFAA by using that access for the purpose
of obtaining others’ advertisements and placing copies of its advertisements on the site); Meats by
Linz, Inc. v. Dear, No. 3:10-CV-1511-D, 2011 WL 1515028 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2011) (citing John,
597 F.3d at 269) (holding that the use of information in violation of a restrictive covenant states a claim
under the CFAA).
99. See Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. v. Carlson, No. 11 C 327, 2011 WL 2923865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July
18, 2011) (citing Int’l Airport Ctrs. L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006)) (“Here,
Carlson is claimed to have begun his solicitation of Deckter before departing Deloitte. The data
destruction was done, in part, to cover his tracks in wrongfully soliciting Deckter. If, as claimed,

Dial & MOYE_18 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

1462

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

7/15/2013 5:53 PM

[Vol. 64:1447

followed Rodriguez as consistently. At least one district court in that
circuit has recognized that the CFAA applies to an employee’s misuse of
100
information in violation of an employer’s computer use policies.
In summary, the federal circuits are significantly divided as to the
scope of the CFAA and the extent to which otherwise permissible access
to information can be construed as “unauthorized” to warrant the
imposition of CFAA liability. The Fourth Circuit exacerbated this circuit
split in WEC. As it now stands, courts in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits—as well as, perhaps, the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits—have
adopted the view that the CFAA does not extend to employees who have
access to electronically stored trade secrets and company information, and
who misuse that information in contravention of an employer’s computer
use policies. In contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have
adhered to the view that an employee’s otherwise legitimate access can
be rendered “unauthorized” when she exceeds the scope of the access
given or otherwise engages in improper use of such information in
violation of the employer’s policies. Until the Supreme Court resolves
this matter, the scope of the CFAA will depend largely on the location of
the dispute involving misuse of electronic information.

III. What the Circuit Split Means for Employers and Their
Electronic Trade Secrets
The circuit split over the scope of the CFAA has significantly
impacted employers and their ability to prevent their employees’ misuse
of electronic information and trade secrets. Until recently, employers

Carlson was so nakedly violating his Director Agreement, he would have been acting contrary to his
employer’s interests, thereby ending his agency relationship with Deloitte and making his conduct
‘without authorization.’”); Jarosch v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 837 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1021 (E.D. Wis.
2011) (“The plaintiffs undeniably had authority to access American Family’s customer information
while acting on behalf of American Family. However, as previously found, the plaintiffs breached their
respective duties of loyalty to American Family. Thus, the plaintiffs’ breach of their respective duties
of loyalty, namely their having taken American Family policyholder information for the benefit of their
new insurance agencies, appears to have terminated their authority to access American Family’s customer
information.”); Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 760, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Taking these
allegations as true, as the Court must do at this stage of the case, Wu was allegedly accessing
confidential Motorola computers to send Motorola’s confidential information to its competitor’s chief
information officer. This is sufficient to describe the accessing of Motorola’s computers without or in
excess of Wu’s authorization, satisfying the requirement that Motorola allege that Wu’s unauthorized
access resulted in her obtaining information from Motorola’s protected computers.”).
100. See Amedisys Holding v. Interim Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1315
(N.D. Ga. 2011) (“While there is some question of whether Plaintiff generally permitted Mack to send
the Referral Logs to her personal email account, there is no question that Mack exceeded any
authority she had when she sent them to herself after accepting a position at Interim for use in
competing with Amedisys.”). But see Trademotion, L.L.C. v. Marketcliq, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1290–91 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he CFAA was intended to prohibit electronic trespassing, not the
subsequent use or misuse of information.”).
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typically included a CFAA claim as a supplemental remedy—in addition
to a state law claim for trade secret misappropriation—when faced with
101
theft of electronic information. Prior to the recent decisions narrowing
its scope, the CFAA had been a useful tool in the arsenal of a trade
secret plaintiff—particularly as it allowed a party to obtain federal court
jurisdiction over trade secret claims involving the theft of electronic trade
secrets. Recently, however, the narrowing of the statute has negatively
impacted employers: Not only does it drastically limit the ability to
obtain federal court jurisdiction over trade secret claims, but it also
places the onus on employers to anticipate and prevent the electronic
theft of information by their employees by narrowly defining each
employee’s ability to use company electronic information.
First, the narrow reading of CFAA has had the indirect effect of
making it much more difficult to obtain federal court jurisdiction in cases
of electronic trade secret misappropriation. Indeed, in WEC, the plaintiff
brought a civil suit in federal district court in South Carolina, invoking
102
federal jurisdiction under the CFAA. After dismissing the CFAA
claim, the court in WEC dismissed the remaining state law claims for lack
103
of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, the WEC panel seemed to
recognize that its decision would foreclose the ability of plaintiffs (absent
diversity) to bring claims involving theft of electronic trade secrets in a
104
federal forum. Thus, one harmful impact of the circuit split (and the
narrow construction afforded to the CFAA by those circuits following
WEC and Nosal) is that, at least in certain jurisdictions, a trade secret
plaintiff will have to establish diversity jurisdiction to pursue relief for
electronic trade secret theft in a federal forum or be forced to litigate
these complex claims in a state court. This has made it much more
difficult to pursue trade secret violations because local procedural rules
vary and state case law lacks uniformity.
Moreover, employers operating in jurisdictions that have adopted a
narrow approach to the CFAA will now be unable to protect their
electronic trade secrets merely by implementing written computer use
restrictions. The Fourth Circuit’s WEC ruling makes clear that computer
use restrictions are necessary but not sufficient to protect confidential

101. See, e.g., Mobile Mark, Inc. v. Pakosz, No. 11-C-2983, 2011 WL 3898032 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6,
2011) (bringing a claim for trade secret theft alongside a CFAA claim); AssociationVoice, Inc. v.
AtHome Net, Inc., No. 10-CV-00109, 2011 WL 63508 (D. Col. Jan. 6, 2011) (same); Pac. Aerospace &
Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (same).
102. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, No. 0:10-cv-2775-CMC, 2011 WL
379458, at *5 (D. S.C. Feb. 3, 2011).
103. Id. at *6.
104. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012)
(noting that, although recourse under the CFAA for the alleged conduct was no longer available,
“nine other state law causes of action potentially provide relief”).
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electronic information because an employee’s mere violation of a use
restriction (such as the theft of electronic data) will not support CFAA
liability if the employee’s “access” to the data was otherwise permitted.
Consequently, employers in these circuits will be forced to revamp their
practices and take additional steps to protect their most sensitive
electronic files, most likely by carving out and identifying a discrete set of
employees who should be given access to categories of information,
manually barring such access for all other employees, and changing
access levels for employees when their job functions change. The narrow
approach is very restrictive and essentially affords employers the
opportunity to obtain civil liability only against employee “hackers.”
The narrow approach also seems woefully inconsistent with the
fundamental purpose of the CFAA, which was drafted to prohibit a range
of acts of computer misuse (without regard to the type of information
stolen) and which, if anything, has been substantially broadened since its
105
initial passage in 1984. In light of technological developments in the
nearly thirty years since its enactment, it seems inconsistent to read the
CFAA as a narrow statute—designed only to penalize hacking—when the
amendments to the statute suggest that it is intended to have a much
broader application, particularly in the civil context. Moreover, the plain
language of the statute—with two separate prongs, “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access”—can be read broadly enough to
encompass both the acts of rogue employees who “hack” into areas of the
company to which they have no access (the “without authorization”
prong) and the conduct of thieving employees who willfully violate their
employer’s computer use restrictions and thereby steal electronic data
and information for an improper purpose (the “exceeds authorized
106
access” prong).
In light of the statutory language and intent—not to mention the
detrimental impact that the narrow Nosal/WEC approach has on an
employer’s ability to prohibit the theft of its electronic trade secrets in a
federal forum—the reasonable interpretation of the CFAA is the one
articulated by Judge Posner in Citrin, which has been followed by the
107
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Under this view, an employee with access to
information should be construed as having exceeded the scope of the
105. See Booms, supra note 18, at 560.
106. See P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 504,
510 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he scope of [the CFAA’s] reach has been expanded over the last two
decades.”); S. Rep. No. 104-357, 1996 WL 492169, at *7–8 (1996) (“[T]he proposed § 1030(a)(2)(C) is
intended to protect against the interstate or foreign theft of information by computer. . . . This
[section] would ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer
is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items are protected. . . . The crux of the offense under
subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse of a computer to obtain the information.”).
107. Int’l Airport Ctrs. L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006).

Dial & MOYE_18 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

June 2013]

7/15/2013 5:53 PM

TRADE SECRETS AND THE CFAA

1465

access she was originally given when she engages in improper,
unauthorized, or otherwise disloyal “use” of such information in violation
of the employer’s computer policies. In such cases, the proper approach is
to construe the employee’s access as being “unauthorized,” given that the
employer did not “authorize” its employee to engage in an improper theft
or misuse of that information.
The contrary view—as reflected in WEC—renders civil CFAA
actions of dubious efficacy for use by employers because it prohibits
them from using the CFAA to prevent the internal electronic theft of
information unless the employer anticipated the theft in the first place
(such as by limiting access at the outset of the employment relationship).
This renders the CFAA limited in reach, remedying only cases of
external hacking.
Most importantly, the reasoning behind the narrow view of the
CFAA focuses on concerns about proper notice to a potential defendant
108
facing criminal liability. In the civil context, where the remedies
available do not include loss of civil liberties, there is no similar policy
concern that requires such a narrow construction. One possible way to
“bridge the split” between the two circuits—either by Supreme Court
intervention or by legislative amendment—would be to adopt the
broader view of CFAA liability in the context of civil claims, while
limiting criminal liability solely to those cases in which an individual is
plainly not permitted to access certain information and nevertheless
steals it via an act of computer hacking (either internal or external).

IV. Healing the Split: Why the Supreme Court Should Clarify
the Scope of the CFAA
As noted above, the circuit split has exacerbated confusion over the
scope of the CFAA and its effectiveness as a tool in cases involving
disloyal employees. This confusion is problematic for employers who have
to take additional measures to enforce their internal computer policies and
to create more individualized policies for each employee. It also creates a
notable lack of uniformity among the circuits in an important (and
growing) area of the law. Moreover, in those jurisdictions taking a narrow
approach to the CFAA, employers are effectively barred from pursuing a
trade secret misappropriation action involving the theft of electronic trade
secrets in a federal forum unless diversity jurisdiction is present.
The confusion over the scope and breadth of the CFAA has had
serious implications beyond the employment arena. In January 2013, for
example, Aaron Swartz, a twenty-six-year-old Internet activist who was
being prosecuted under the CFAA for allegedly hacking into an online
108. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2012); WEC, 687 F.3d at 206.
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academic database and downloading journal articles (not for economic
109
gain), committed suicide on the eve of his trial. His death prompted
criticism, not only of the prosecutor who zealously pursued the charges
under the CFAA, but also of the CFAA itself and its broad “unauthorized
access” language; some even blamed Swartz’s prosecution in part on the
110
“extremely problematic” language of the CFAA. In response, the House
Judiciary Committee announced on January 24, 2013, that it intended to
review the breadth of the CFAA, and Representative Zoe Lofgren (DCal.) proposed an amendment that would drastically narrow the scope of
111
the CFAA. Such criticism, however, ignored the fact that facing civil
liability for an act has drastically different ramifications than does facing
criminal liability, and the fair notice required to alert individuals to
potential criminal liability is much higher than the notice required for
112
potential civil liability. Moreover, this recent criticism over the vague
language of the statute arguably offered a perfect opportunity for the
Supreme Court to clarify the scope of the phrase “unauthorized access”
in both the civil and criminal contexts.
Any immediate hopes that the Supreme Court might resolve the
circuit split were dashed on January 2, 2013, when the Court issued an
order denying the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by WEC in the
113
wake of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. Thus, for the time being, the split
will remain between those jurisdictions—like the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits—that take a narrow approach to the meaning of “exceeds
authorized access” and those jurisdictions—like the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits—that take a more expansive approach to the CFAA.
As a result, it will be imperative for employers to create more
individualized computer use restrictions in order to attempt to protect
the viability of a CFAA claim in any jurisdiction.

109. See, e.g., Mike Scarcella, Hacking Defendant’s Suicide Spurs Debate over Prosecutors, Fulton
Cnty. Daily Rep., Jan. 16, 2013, at 9–10.
110. Id.
111. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, House Will Review CFAA After Pioneer Swartz’s Death, Law 360
(Jan. 23, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/409186.
112. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982) (“The Court has . . . expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal
penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“For obvious reasons, the standard of
certainty required in criminal statutes is more exacting than in noncriminal statutes. This is simply
because it would be unthinkable to convict a man for violating a law he could not understand.”
(footnote omitted)).
113. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (denying cert.).
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Conclusion
Unfortunately, so long as the circuit split remains, employers,
practitioners, and courts alike will continue to lack guidance as to the
scope of liability under the CFAA, particularly in cases of disloyal
employees who violate computer use restrictions. It seems inevitable that
the Supreme Court will again be asked to weigh in on the scope of the
CFAA, perhaps when a circuit that is currently silent on this matter issues
a ruling that aligns with the broader view of the CFAA. When that occurs,
one can only hope that the Supreme Court will exercise its discretion and
agree to step into the fray and resolve the circuit split. Until that time—at
least in certain jurisdictions—an employer’s computer use restrictions that
merely prohibit disloyal use of electronic information will be insufficient to
protect confidential electronic information from internal employee theft
under the CFAA.

